The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In
Key Takeaways
- Cyble Research & Intelligence Labs (CRIL) identified a sample of Embargo ransomware, developed in Rust.
- The Threat Actors behind this ransomware are using double extortion tactics.
- We observed an instance where the ransomware group Initially demanded a $1 million ransom payment, threatening data leak and notifications to various parties upon non-payment.
- The leak site User Interfaces of Embargo and ALPHV ransomware resemble each other. Additionally, the leak site of ALPHV ransomware was taken down by law enforcement in March 2024.
- The log generation structure of both the ransomware looks similar.
- Embargo, to date, has disclosed details of four victims globally.
- This ransomware Utilizes ChaCha20 and Curve25519 for file encryption and appends “.564ba1” extension to encrypted files.
Overview
CRIL found a sample of Embargo ransomware, which is developed in Rust programming language. TAs behind this ransomware are using double extortion to target its victims. In double extortion, the TAs exfiltrate sensitive information from the victim’s systems before encrypting the data.
They then threaten to publicly release or sell this stolen data if the ransom is not paid. This adds additional pressure on the victim, as the potential data breach can lead to severe reputational damage, legal consequences, and loss of customer trust. The figure below shows the leak site of Embargo ransomware.
Figure 1 – Embargo Ransomware Leak Site
During our investigation, we discovered that this ransomware group initially demanded a $1 million ransom, as indicated on their chat site. The Threat Actors (TAs) also claim on this site that if the victim fails to pay the ransom, they will not only leak the data but also notify the victim’s clients, employees, partners, investors, stakeholders, and government authorities about the attack. The figure below illustrates the ransom amount demanded by the group.
Figure 2 – Ransom Demand
We also observed similarities in the user interface of ALPHV (Blackcat) ransomware and the Embargo ransomware leak site. The leak site of ALPHV ransomware was taken down by law enforcement in March 2024. The figure below shows the comparison between the two leak sites.
Figure 3 – Comparison of ALPHV and Embargo Ransomware Leak Site
Upon comparing the Rust binaries of both ransomware samples, we observed an overlap in the structure and syntax used for generating log files. Although the ALPHV ransomware binary has more capabilities, we suspect that Embargo might be a rewritten version of ALPHV. The Rust binary of ALPHV ransomware surfaced in 2022. The figure below shows both ransomware binaries executed in verbose mode.
Figure 4 – Comparison of Logs
Embargo ransomware, to date, has mentioned four victims globally. The figure below shows the distribution of Embargo’s victims.
Figure 5 – Geographic distribution of victims
Technical Analysis
The behavior of this ransomware can be controlled using command-line arguments. Upon execution, it calls GetCommandLineW() to check for the arguments as shown in the figure below.
Figure 6 – Checking CommandLine Arguments
It then checks for the following arguments
| Argument | Alternate Argument | Description |
| -t | –threads <THREADS> | number of threads, leave default to automatically assign |
| -p | –path <PATH> | path to directory |
| –no-delete | disable self-delete | |
| –partial | enable searching for partially encrypted files and finish encrypting (if a previous run failed) | |
| -l | –log | enable output to log |
| -v | –verbose | enable verbose output |
| -f | –follow-sym | enable follow symlinks |
| -m | –multi-run | allow more than one instance run on the same host |
| –no-net | do not search for network resources to encrypt | |
| -n | –net-path <NETWORK_PATHS> | list of servers to target |
| -h | –help | Print help |
The presence of hardcoded commands on how to use this ransomware binary reveals insights into the TA’s mentality and tactics. These examples suggest the specific types of folders and directories the TAs typically target during their attacks. The TA has mentioned the following directories:
- R:backups
- \files01finance
- \10.0.3.2D$Accounting
Figure 7 – Command line Arguments
After getting the command line arguments, the ransomware binary creates a mutex named “LoadUpOnGunsBringYourFriends” using the CreateMutexW() function. Unlike other ransomware variants, this one uses a hardcoded mutex name instead of generating a string at runtime. The figure below illustrates the mutex created by the ransomware binary.
Figure 8 – CreateMutex()
Following this, the ransomware proceeds to clear the recycle bin by invoking the SHEmptyRecycleBinW() function. Typically, this action is taken to hinder the victim’s ability to restore any deleted files after encryption. The figure below shows the ransomware clearing the recycle bin.
Figure 9 – Clears RecycleBin
Next, it executes the following command to disable the Windows recovery:
- C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe /q /c bcdedit /set {default} recoveryenabled no
The ransomware then captures a snapshot of active running processes using CreateToolhelp32Snapshot() and iterates over them with Process32First() and Process32Next(). It checks if any of the processes listed below are running and terminates them if a match is found.
| agntsvc.exe | sql.exe | QBIDPService.exe |
| dbeng50.exe | steam.exe | QBDBMgrN.exe |
| dbsnmp.exe | synctime.exe | QBCFMonitorService.exe |
| encsvc.exe | tbirdconfig.exe | SAP.exe |
| excel.exe | thebat.exe | TeamViewer_Service.exe |
| firefox.exe | thunderbird.exe | TeamViewer.exe |
| infopath.exe | visio.exe | tv_w32.exe |
| isqlplussvc.exe | winword.exe | tv_x64.exe |
| msaccess.exe | wordpad.exe | cvd.exe |
| mspub.exe | xfssvccon.exe | cvfwd.exe |
| mydesktopqos.exe | *sql*.exe | cvods.exe |
| mydesktopservice.exe | bedbh.exe | saphostexec.exe |
| notepad.exe | vxmon.exe | saposcol.exe |
| ocautoupds.exep | benetns.exe | sapstartsrv.exe |
| ocomm.exe | bengien.exe | avscc.exe |
| ocssd.exe | pvlsvr.exe | DellSystemDetect.exes |
| onenote.exe | beserver.exe | EnterpriseClient.exe |
| oracle.exe | raw_agent_svc.exe | veeam*.exe |
| outlook.exe | vsnapvss.exe | VeeamNFSSvc.exe |
| powerpoint.exe | CagService.exe | VeeamTransportSvc.exe |
| sqbcoreservice.exe | vsnapvss.exe | VeeamDeploymentSvc.exe |
The figure below illustrates the ransomware iterating through the active processes.
Figure 10 – Terminating Process
After this, the ransomware retrieves the active services running on the victim’s system. It first calls the OpenSCManagerW() function to obtain a handle to the service control manager database. Then, it calls EnumServicesStatusExW() to enumerate the services in the service control manager database. This call retrieves the status of services, including their names and current states. The ransomware then checks if any of the running services match the following services:
| GxCIMgr$ | MSExchange$.*$ |
| MVArmor$ | AcronisAgent$ |
| VSNAPVSS$ | VeeamTransportSvc$ |
| VeeamNFSSvc$ | BackupExecVSSProvider$ |
| QBCFMonitorService$ | BackupExecManagementService |
| GxVssHWProv$ | SAPD$$xecManagementSe |
| QBDBMgrN$ | QBIDPService$ |
| BackupExecRPCService$ | AcrSch2Svc$ |
| VeeamTransportSvc$ | SAPService$ |
| MVarmor64$ | SAPHostControl$ |
| SAPHostControl$ | BackupExecJobEngine$ce |
| SAPHostExec$ | BackupExecRPCService$ |
| QBCFMonitorService$ | GxClMgrS$ |
If a match is found, it closes the service by calling the CloseServiceHandle() function. The figure below illustrates the ransomware iterating through services.
Figure 11 – Terminating Services
The ransomware now starts iterating through device volumes using the FindFirstVolumeW() and FindNextVolumeW() functions. It then calls the GetVolumePathNamesForVolumeNameW() function to retrieve a list of drive letters and mounted folder paths for each specified volume.
Figure 12 – Fetching Drives
After this, it uses the WNetEnumResourceW() function to enumerate the network resources. It then starts enumerating the files in the drives for encryption using GetDriveTypeW() and, FindFirstFileW() and FindNextFileW() functions, as shown in the figure below.
Figure 13 – Enumerating Drives
This ransomware does not encrypt the following directories on a device. The ransomware binary contains regular expressions for these directory names.
| ProgramData/Microsoft/DeviceSync[^/]*$ | ProgramData/USOShared[^/]*$ |
| ProgramData/Microsoft/Diagnosis[^/]*$ | Program Files/WindowsApps[^/]*$ |
| ProgramData/ssh/[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/UEV[^/]*$ |
| Program Files/Windows Portable Devices[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/Device Stage[^/]*$ |
| Program Files/Uninstall Information[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Packages/USOShared[^/]*$ |
| ProgramData/regid.[^/]*.com.microsoft$vic | ProgramData/Microsoft/Event Viewer[^/]*$ |
| ProgramData/USOPrivate[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/Provisioning[^/]*$ |
| Program Files/Windows Defender[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/IdentityCRL$ |
| Program Files/Windows Media Player[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/NetFramework[^/]*$ |
| Program Files/Windows Security[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/Spectrum[^/]*$ |
| Program Files/Windows Photo Viewer[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/Windows Defender[^/]*$ |
| Program Files/ModifiableWindowsApps[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/MapData[^/]*$ |
| Program Files/Internet Explorer[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/WDF[^/]*$ |
| Program Files/Windows NT[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/Storage Health[^/]*$ |
| Program Files/Windows Sidebar[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/Windows[^/]*$ |
| Program Files/WindowsPowerShell[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/Search[^/]*$ |
| Program Files (x86)/Microsoft.NET[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/Vault[^/]*$ |
| Program Files (x86)/Windows Defender[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/SmsRouter[^/]*$ |
| Program Files/Invisible Things Lab/[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/Speech_OneCore[^/]*$ |
| Program Files (x86)/Microsoft/Temp[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/Windows NT[^/]*$ |
| Program Files (x86)/Windows NT[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/MF[^/]*$ |
| Program Files (x86)/Windows Security[^/]*$s | ProgramData/Microsoft/Network[^/]*$ |
| Program Files (x86)/Windows Mail[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/WinMSIPC[^/]*$ |
| Program Files (x86)/Windows Sidebar[^/]*$am | ProgramData/Microsoft/WPD[^/]*$ |
| Program Files (x86)/Common Files[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Microsoft/EdgeUpdate[^/]*$ |
| Program Files/Common Files/System[^/]*$ | ProgramData/Packages/USOPrivate[^/]*$ |
| Program Files/Windows Mail[^/]*$o | ProgramData/Microsoft/DRM[^/]*$ |
| ProgramData/ntuser.pol$X | ProgramData/USOShared[^/]*$ |
Also, this ransomware does not encrypt files with the following extensions. The list includes the “.564ba1” extension, which is appended to files after encryption. This ensures that the ransomware will not encrypt the same file twice.
| .cpl | .sys | .drv |
| d3d9caps.dat | */NTUSER.DAT | .lnk |
| thumbs.db | .msi | *.search-ms |
| .ico | .dll | desktop.ini |
| .bat | .lock | .deskthemepack |
| iconcache.db | .msc | .theme |
| ntldr | .themeckpack | autorun.inf |
| d3d9caps.dat | .lock | boot.ini |
| .spl | .exe | .msstyles |
| .cab | .msu | .themepack |
| .564ba1 |
This ransomware uses ChaCha20 and Curve25519 to encrypt files, as shown in the figure below. ChaCha20 and Curve25519 are often used together in file encryption to provide secure key exchange and encryption. Curve25519 establishes a shared secret key, which is then used by ChaCha20 to encrypt and decrypt the file contents.
Figure 14 – Cryptographic Algorithms
Next, the ransomware drops a ransom note named “HOW_TO_RECOVER_FILES.txt” in every directory it iterates through. This note appears to be created specific to a victim, as date and time values are hardcoded rather than dynamically loading the current date and time.
Figure 15 – Ransom Note
All the encrypted files consist of “.564ba1” as a file extension, as shown in the figure below.
Figure 16 – Encrypted Files
LINUX and ESXI Variants
Additional files obtained from their onion site are suspected to be Linux and ESXi variants of the Embargo ransomware, but their true origin is uncertain. We suspect these to be test files as they lack configuration data and are not able to encrypt the files. These alleged variants of Embargo ransomware are 64-bit executables. Although they use the same encryption algorithm across all variants, the Linux binary offers fewer options than the Windows binary. By default, these variants utilize 4 threads, whereas the Windows variant employs 8 threads for execution. The figure below depicts the command-line arguments available in Linux variants.
Figure 17 – Embargo Linux executable
Figure 18 – Embargo ESXi executable
Conclusion
Embargo ransomware exemplifies the growing trend of using programming languages like Rust to create sophisticated, cross-platform ransomware. The choice of Rust provides the attackers with advantages such as cross-platform compatibility, speed, and memory safety, making the ransomware more robust and difficult to analyze or reverse-engineer. The double extortion technique used by ransomware not only pressurizes victims to pay quickly to avoid data breaches but also exposes them to potential legal and reputational damage. The TA’s threat to notify clients, employees, partners, investors, stakeholders, and government authorities further amplifies the urgency and severity of the situation.
Our Recommendations
We have listed some essential cybersecurity best practices that create the first line of control against attackers. We recommend that our readers follow the best practices given below:
Safety Measures to Prevent Ransomware Attacks
- Do not open untrusted links and email attachments without first verifying their authenticity.
- Conduct regular backup practices and keep those backups offline or in a separate network.
- Turn on the automatic software update feature on your computer, mobile, and other connected devices wherever possible and pragmatic.
- Use a reputed anti-virus and Internet security software package on your connected devices, including PC, laptop, and mobile.
MITRE ATT&CK® Techniques
| Tactic | Technique | Procedure |
| Execution | T1204.002 (User Execution) | Malicious file. |
| Defense Evasion | T1070.004 (Indicator Removal: File Deletion) | Ransomware deletes itself after execution. |
| Defense Evasion | T1140 (Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information) | Contains encrypted strings. |
| Discovery | T1083 (File and Directory Discovery) | Ransomware enumerates folders for file encryption and file deletion. |
| Discovery | T1135 (Network Share Discovery) | Target Network Shares |
| Impact | T1486 (Data Encrypted for Impact) | Ransomware encrypts the data for extortion. |
| Impact | T1490 (Inhibit System Recovery) | Disable automatic Windows recovery |
Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
| Indicators | Indicator Type | Description |
| 98cc01dcd4c36c47fc13e4853777ca170c734613564a5a764e4d2541a6924d39 | SHA256 | Embargo Ransomware (Windows) |
| 7bfb789f5825f17a01cccd2fbd62635ce20f6ed7e488fded20549a806371aeb6 | SHA256 | Embargo Ransomware (ESXi) |
| e6b6503217b0cf50e262a6a843624068f8f6a96441d241695893e6cab3c60a2c | SHA256 | Embargo Ranosmware (Linux) |
Yara Rule
rule Embargo{
meta:
author = "Cyble Research and Intelligence Labs"
description = "Detects Embargo Ransomware"
date = "2024-05-24"
os = "Windows"
strings:
$a1 = "LoadUpOnGunsBringYourFriends" fullword ascii wide
$a2 = "embargo" nocase ascii wide
$a3 = "files01" nocase ascii wide
condition:
all of them
} The post The Rust Revolution: New Embargo Ransomware Steps In appeared first on Cyble.
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